We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of R n that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in [11], we provide conditions ensuring that these dynamics are gradient like and satisfy a suitable "angle condition". This is used to prove that omega limit sets and chain transitive sets (under certain smoothness assumptions) consist of equilibria; and that, in the real analytic case, every trajectory converges toward an equilibrium. In the reversible case, the dynamics are shown to be C 1 close to a gradient vector field. Properties of equilibria -with a special emphasis on potential games -and structural stability questions are also considered.
Introduction
Let S be a finite set, say S = {1, . . . , n}. A rate matrix over S is a n × n matrix L such that L ij ≥ 0 for i = j and j L ij = 0. We let R(S) denote the space of such matrices. For x ∈ R n and L ∈ R(S) we let xL denote the vector defined by (xL) i = j x j L ji .
Let ∆ = {x ∈ R n : x i ≥ 0,
be the unit simplex of probabilities over S. In this paper we are interested in ordinary differential equations on ∆ having the form dx dt = xL(x) := F (x) (1) where L : ∆ → R(S) is a sufficiently smooth function. Such dynamics occur -through a natural averaging procedure-in models of games describing strategic interactions in a large population of players, as well as in certain models of learning and reinforcement. These models are usually derived from qualitative assumptions describing the "microscopic" behavior of anonymous agents, and it is usually believed or assumed that similar qualitative microscopic behaviors should lead to similar global dynamics. However there is no satisfactory general theory supporting this belief.
To be more precise, under the assumption that L(x) is irreducible, there exists a unique "invariant probability" for L(x), π(x) ∈ ∆ characterized by π(x)L(x) = 0.
Several models corresponding to different rate functions x → L(x) have the same invariant probability function x → π(x). For instance, to each population game (see section 2.1) which average ODE is given by (1) , there is a canonical way to define a learning process (see section 2.2) which average ODE is given by
but there is no evidence that the dynamics of (1) and (3) are related in general. The purpose of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions on π(x) ensuring that (1) has a gradient-like structure. This heavily relies on an idea introduced in [11] where it was shown that the relative entropy between x and π(x) is a strict Lyapounov function for systems of Gibbs type. We extend this idea to other class of systems beyond systems of Gibbs type, including population games and reinforcement process with imitative dynamics, and investigate further dynamics properties.
To give the flavor of the results presented in this paper, let π : ∆ →∆ be a smooth function mapping ∆ into its relative interior. Let χ π be the set of vector fields having the form given by (the right hand side of) (1) , where for each x, L(x) is irreducible and verifies (2) . Note that χ π is a convex set of vector fields on ∆ and that F π ∈ χ π .
Theorem A For all F ∈ χ π .
(i) Equilibria (respectively non degenerate equilibria) of F coincide with equilibria (respectively non degenerate equilibria) of F π .
(ii) In general, global dynamics of F and F π are "unrelated." We construct an example for which F π is globally asymptotically stable (every trajectory converge toward a linearly stable equilibrium) while every non equilibrium trajectory for F converge to a limit cycle.
(iii) Assume that there exists a C k , k ≥ 1 strictly increasing function s : R → R such that x ∈∆ → s((
)) i∈S is the gradient (or quasi gradient) of some function V :∆ → R. Then (a) V is a strict Lyapounov function for F (F is gradient-like) and verifies an angle condition, (b) Omega limit sets and chain-transitive sets of F are equilibria, (c) In the real analytic case, every solution to (1) converge toward an equilibrium, (d) In the reversible case, hyperbolic equilibria of F coincide with non degenerate critical points of V and, provided there are finitely many equilibria, F is C 1 close to a gradient vector field for a certain Riemannian metric, (e) The set χ π is not (in general) structurally stable. Section 2 describes a few examples that motivate this work. Section 3 contains some preliminary results and the main assumptions. Section 4 is devoted to Theorem A, (ii); Section 5 to (iii), (a), (b), (c); Sections 6 and 7 to (iii)(d) and Section 8 to (iii)(e). Other results and examples are also discussed in these sections. For instance, in Section 6.1, the local dynamics (dynamics in the neighborhood of equilibria) of mean field systems associated to potential games is precisely described in term of Nash equilibria.
Motivating examples
Throughout this section we see S as set of pure strategies. A Markov matrix over S is a n×n matrix K such that K ij ≥ 0 and j K ij = 1. We let M(S) denote the sets of such matrices and we assume given a lipschitz map K : ∆ → M(S).
For further reference we may call such a map a revision protocol. This terminology is borrowed from [24] .
Population Games
Good references on the subject include [23] and the survey paper [24] from which some of the examples here are borrowed. Consider a population of N agents, each of whom chooses a strategy in S at discrete times k = 1, 2, . . . . Depending on the context, an agent can be a player, a set of players, a biological entity, a communication device, etc. The state of the system at time k ∈ N is the vector
equals the number of agents having strategy i. The system evolves as follows. Assume that at time k the system is in state X N k = x. Then an agent is randomly chosen in the population. If the chosen agent is an i−strategist, he/she switches to strategy j with probability K ij (x). This makes (X N k ) k≥1 a discrete time Markov chain, which transition probabilities are
where (e 1 , . . . , e n ) is the standard basis of R n . Let
By standard mean-field approximation (see [16] , [8] for precise statements, and [23] , [24] for discussions in the context of games), the process {(X 
Revision protocols
Assume, as it is often the case in economic or biological applications, that the population game is determined by a continuous Payofffunction U : ∆ → R n . The quantity U i (x) represents the payoff (utility, fitness) of an i− strategist when the population state is x.
An attachment-function is a continuous map w : ∆ → R n 2 + . The weight w ij (x) can be seen as an a priori attachment of an i−strategist for strategy j. It can also encompasses certain constraints on the strategy sets. For instance w ij (x) = 0 (respectively w ij (x) << 1) if a move from i to j is forbidden (respectively costly). We call the attachment function imitative if
Most, not to say all, revision protocols in population games fall into one of the two next categories:
where f is a non negative increasing function.
(
where g(u, v) is nonnegative, decreasing in u, increasing in v and such that j =i K ij (x) ≤ 1.
Processes with reinforcement and adaptive learning
Suppose now there is only one single agent in the population. In the context of games, one can imagine that this agent consists of a finite set of players and that S is the cartesian product of the strategy sets of the players. let X k ∈ S denote the strategy of this agent at time k. Let µ k ∈ ∆ denote the empirical occupation measure of (X k ) up to time k. That is
δ X j where δ : S → ∆ is defined by δ i = e i . Suppose now that the agent revises her strategies as follows:
The process (X k ) is no longer a Markov process but a process with reinforcement (see [21] for a survey of the literature on the subject). Using tools from stochastic approximation theory, it can be shown (see [1] ) that, under certain irreducibility assumptions, the long term behavior of (µ k ) can be precisely related (see [1] , [2] , [4] and the brief discussion preceding corollary 5.15) to the long term behavior of the differential equation on ∆
where π(x) ∈ ∆ is the invariant probability of K(x). Note that (8) can be rewritten as (1) with L ij (x) = δ ij − π j (x).
Hypotheses, Notation, and Preliminaries
Let L be a rate matrix, as defined in the introduction. Then L is the infinitesimal generator of a continuous time Markov chains on S. A probability π ∈ ∆ is called invariant for L if it is invariant for the associated Markov chain, or equivalently
A sufficient condition ensuring that π ∈ ∆ is invariant is that L is reversible with respect to π, meaning that
The matrix is said irreducible if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exist some integer k and a sequence of indices
An irreducible rate matrix admits a unique invariant probability which can be expressed as a rational function of the coefficients (L ij ) (see e.g Chapter 6 of [12] ).
The relative interior of ∆ is the seṫ ∆ = {x ∈ ∆ : ∀i ∈ S, x i > 0}.
From now on we assume given a C 1 map 1 L : ∆ → R(S) satisfying the following assumption:
We sometimes assume
In view of the preceding discussion Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 imply the following Lemma 3.3 There exists a C 1 map π :∆ →∆ such that for all x ∈∆, y = π(x) is the unique solution to the equation
If L is C k , C ∞ or real analytic, the same is true for π. Under Hypothesis 3.2, π is defined on all ∆ and maps ∆ into∆.
We let F π denote the map defined as
Throughout, it is implicitly assumed that the domain of F π is∆ under Hypothesis 3.1 and ∆ under Hypothesis 3.2.
1 By this we mean that L is the restriction to ∆ of a C 1 map defined in a neighborhood of ∆ in af f (∆) = {x ∈ R n : i x 1 = 1}
We now consider the dynamics induced by (1) . Without loss of generality, we may assume that (1) is defined on all R n and induces a flow Φ = (Φ t ) leaving ∆ positively invariant. Indeed, by convexity of ∆, the retraction r : R n → ∆ defined by r(x) = argmin y∈∆ x − y is Lipschitz so that the differential equation
is Lipchitz and sub-linear on all R n . By standard results, it then induces a flow Φ : R × R n → R n where t → Φ(t, y) = Φ t (y) is the unique solution to (10) with initial condition y. For all x ∈ ∆ and t ≥ 0, Φ t (x) ∈ ∆ and the map t ∈ R + → Φ t (x) is solution to (1) . In the following we sometime use the notation Φ t (x) = x(t) = (x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t)). The tangent space of ∆ is the space
Lemma 3.4 (i)
There exists α ≥ 0 such that for all x ∈ ∆ x i (t) ≥ e −αt x i (0). In particular,∆ is positively invariant.
(ii) If for all x ∈ ∂∆ L(x) is irreducible, then Φ t (∆) ⊂∆ for all t > 0 and the dynamics (1) admits a global attractor
Hence
The second inequality is the first statement. From the first inequality and the continuity of L(x(t)) it follows that x i (t) > 0 for all t > 0 whenever that x j L ji (x) > 0. Let now x ∈ ∂∆. Assume without loss of generality that x 1 > 0. By irreducibility there exists a sequence
Hence, by continuity, L i l ,i l+1 (x(t)) > 0 for all t small enough. It then follows that x j (t) > 0 for all t > 0 Remark 3.5 Assumption 3.1 is not needed in Lemma 3.4.
Throughout we let
denote the equilibria set of F. Note that in view of the preceding Lemmas Eq(F ) ∩∆ = {x ∈∆ :
and, in case L(x) is irreducible for all x ∈ ∆, Eq(F ) ⊂∆. An equilibrium p is called non degenerate for F provided the Jacobian matrix DF (p) : T ∆ → T ∆ is invertible. Lemma 3.6 Let p ∈ Eq(F ) ∩∆. Then p is non degenerate for F if and only if it is non degenerate for Suppose n = 3 so that ∆ is the unit simplex in R 3 . Let G be a smooth vector field on ∆ such that:
where
It is easy to construct such a vector field. Choose ε > 0 small enough so that εG(x) + x lies in∆ for all x ∈ ∆ and set π(x) = εG(x) + x. Then, F π and G have the same orbits.
Let W be a 3 × 3 symmetric irreducible matrix with positive
is an irreducible rate matrix, reversible with respect to π(x). It follows from Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6 that F (x) = xL(x) has a global attractor contained in∆ and a unique equilibrium given by p.
Furthermore,
where the last equality follows from the definition of L and the fact that π(p) = p. To shorten notation, set b = ε 3
The determinant of this matrix is positive and its trace equals
If one now choose c > d and η small enough, the trace is positive. This makes p linearly unstable. By Poincaré-Bendixson theorem, it follows that every forward trajectory distinct from p converges toward a periodic orbit.
Remark 4.1 It was pointed out to me by Sylvain Sorin and Josef
Hofbauer that this example is reminiscent of the following phenomenon. Consider a population game which revision protocol takes the form
. This is a particular case of imitative pairwise comparison protocol (see equation (7)). Then, the mean field ode is the classical replicator dynamics (see example 3.2 in [24] ):ẋ
Here the rate matrix L(x) is not irreducible and its set of invariant probabilities is easily seen to be the Best Reply set
where conv(A) stands for the convex hull of A. The vector field (9) is not defined but can be replaced by the differential inclusioṅ
If one assume that U i (x) = j U ij x j with U the payoff matrix given by a Rock-Paper-Scissors game,
Then p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is the unique equilibrium of (11) in∆ (corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game) and every solution to (11) with initial condition in∆ \ {p} is a periodic orbit. On the other hands, solutions to (12) converge to p. Phase portraits of these dynamics can be found in ( [24] , section 5) and a detailed comparison of the replicator and the best reply dynamics is provided in [15] .
Gradient Like Structure
for all x ∈∆ and u ∈ T ∆.
Remark 5.2 A practical condition ensuring that h is a gradient is that
This follows from ( [14] , Theorem 19.5.5.)
Notation We use the following convenient notation. If x, y are vectors in R n and s : R → R we let x.y ∈ R n (respectively x y and s(x)) be the vector defined by (xy) i = x i y i (respectively (
Gradient like structure
1 function with positive derivative and let h s :∆ → R n be the map defined by
).
Assume that h s is a α-quasigradient. Then (i) The map V (given by (13)) is a strict Lyapounov function for F on∆;
(ii) The critical points of V coincide with Eq(F ) ∩∆;
(iii) V satisfies the following angle condition: For every compact set K ⊂∆ there exists c > 0 such that
for all x ∈ K.
Remark 5.4 [Gibbs systems]
If π(x) is a Gibbs measure,
where U = (U ij ) is a symmetric matrix, β ≥ 0, and
parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 5.3 have been proved in [11] , Theorems 5.3 and 5.5. Here s(t) = log(t) and
Proof of theorem 5.3
Part (i) relies on the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.5 Let L be an irreducible transition matrix with invariant probability π.
The proof of this lemma uses elementary convexity arguments and classical tools from Markov chain theory. It is proved in appendix. Applying this lemma with L = L(x) and π = π(x) gives
(ii) The set Eq(F ) ∩∆ coincides with fixed points of π in∆. Let x ∈∆. ∇V (x) = 0 ⇔ h s (x) ∈ R1 where 1 is the vector which components are all equal to 1. The function s being injective this is equivalent to
(iii) Let K ⊂∆. By Lemma 5.5 (applied with L = L(x) and π = π(x)) and continuity of the maps involved, there exists c > 0 depending on K such that
To prove the angle condition it then suffices to show that both F (x) and ∇V (x) are bounded by some constant times
By Lipschitz continuity of s and compactness, there exist c 2 , c 3 > 0 depending on K such that
Thus, for all u ∈ T ∆ such that u = 1
This implies that ∇V (x) ≤ c 3 x − π(x) and concludes the proof.
The following result proves to be useful for certain dynamics leaving invariant the boundary of the simplex. Such dynamics occur in population games using imitative protocols (see equation 5) as well as in certain models of vertex reinforcement (see example 5.11 below).
For x ∈ ∆ let Supp(x) = {x ∈ ∆ : x i > 0}.
Proposition 5.6 Assume that assumptions of Theorem 5.3 hold. Assume furthermore that
Then V is strict Lyapounov function for F on ∆.
Therefore, using assumption (b), the equation
for all x ∈ ∆. By Lemma 5.5 the left hand side is nonpositive and zero if and only if
Remark 5.7 Note that under the assumptions of Proposition 5.6, the angle inequality of Theorem 5.3 doesn't hold on the boundary of the simplex
Then, Theorem 5.3 applies in the following cases:
Case 1 ψ(u) = e −βu with β ≥ 0, and f i (t) > 0 for all t > 0. It suffices to choose s(t) = log(t) and
Then h s is the gradient of V.
Then h s is the α-quasigradient of V with
Example 5.9 [Potential Games] Examples of applications of Example 5.8, case 1, are given by Potential Games (see [23] for an comprehensive presentation and motivating examples). We use the notation of section 2. A Potential Game is a game for which the payoff function is such that for all
Consider a population game with a revision protocol given by (7) . Suppose that the attachment matrix takes the form
withw irreducible and symmetric. Let β ≥ 0. Assume furthermore that g(u, v) takes one of the following form:
Imitation driven by dissatisfaction
Imitation of success
In all these situations, K(x), hence L(x) is reversible with respect to π β (x) with
.
Theorem 5.3 applies with V given by (16) . 
and we retrieve the situation considered in [11] . See Remark 5.4.
Example 5.11 [Vertex reinforcement] Let K be the revision protocol defined by
where A is a matrix with positive entries and γ ≥ 1. For population games (see section 2.1) this gives a simple model of imitation: an agent of type i, when chosen, switches to j with a probability proportional to the (number of agents of type j) γ . For processes with reinforcement (as defined in section 2.2) the probability to jump from i to j at time n is proportional to (the time spent in j up to time n)
γ .
This later model called a vertex reinforced random walks was introduced by Diaconis and first analyzed in Pemantle [20] (see also [1] and [7] for more references on the subject). When A is symmetric, K(x) is reversible with respect to
with
We are then in the situation covered by Example 5.8, case 2, with ψ(u) = u, f i (t) = t, s(t) = − Both Theorem 5.3 and Proposition 5.6 apply.
Example 5.12 [Interacting Urn processes] Closely related to vertex reinforced random walks are models of interacting urns (see [3] , [9] , [25] ). For these models
for some smooth function W. This is a particular case of Example 5.8, case 2.
Limit sets and chain transitive sets
Using Lasalle's invariance principle we deduce the following consequences from Theorem 5.3.
Corollary 5.13 Assume that assumptions of Theorem 5.3 hold. Then every omega limit set of Φ contained in∆ is a connected subset of Eq(F ) ∩∆. Then every omega limit set of Φ is a connected subset of Eq(F ).
A set L is called attractor free or internally chain transitive provided it is compact, invariant and Φ|L has no proper attractor. For reinforced random processes like the ones defined in section 2.2, limit sets of (µ n ) are, under suitable assumptions, attractor free sets of the associated mean field equation (8) (see [1] ). More generally attractor free sets are limit sets of asymptotic pseudo trajectories (see [4] 
Then every internally chain transitive set of Φ contained in∆ is a connected subset of Eq(F ) ∩∆. If we furthermore assume that L(x) is irreducible for all x ∈ ∆, then every internally chain transitive set of Φ is a connected subset of Eq(F )
Proof. Let C = Eq(F ) ∩∆ and A ⊂∆ an attractor free set. By Theorem 5.3, C coincide with critical points of V. By the assumption V is C k+1 so that by Sard's theorem (see [13] ), V (C) has empty interior. It follows (see e.g Proposition 6.4 in [2] ) that A ⊂ C.
Convergence toward one equilibrium
In case equilibria are isolated, Corollary 5.13 implies that every trajectory bounded away from the boundary converge to an equilibrium and that every trajectory converges in case L(x) is irreducible for all x. However, when equilibria are degenerate, the gradient-like property is not sufficient to ensures convergence. There are known examples of smooth gradient systems which omega limit sets are a continuum of equilibria (see [19] ). However, in the real analytic case, gradient like systems which verify an angle condition are known to converge Theorem 5.16 Suppose that assumptions of Theorem 5.3 hold and that V is real analytic. Then every omega limit set meeting∆ reduces to a single point.
Proof. Let p be an omega limit point. If V is real analytic, it satisfies a Lojasiewicz inequality at p in the sense that there exist 0 < η ≤ 1/2, β > 0 and a neighborhood U(p) of p such that
for all x in a U(p). Such an inequality called a "gradient inequality" was proved by Lojasiewicz [17] and used (by Lojasiewicz again) to show that bounded solutions of real analytic gradient vector fields have finite length, hence converge. When the dynamics is not a gradient, but only gradient like with V as a strict Lyapounov function, the same results holds provided that V satisfies an angle condition:
for all x ∈ U(p). This is proved in [10] (see also [18] , Theorem 7).
Example 5.17 [Gibbs systems, 3] If π is given by (14) with U symmetric, V given by (15) is real analytic so that every solution to (1) converges toward an equilibrium.
Equilibria
Recall that point p ∈ Eq(F ) is called non degenerate if the jacobian matrix DF (p) : T ∆ → T ∆ is invertible. It is called hyperbolic if eigenvalues of DF (p) have non zero real parts. If p is hyperbolic, T ∆ admits a splitting
) have negative (respectively positive) real parts. Point p ∈ Crit(V ) = {x ∈∆ : ∇(V )(x) = 0} is called nondegenerate if Hess(V )(p) the Hessian or V at p has full rank. In a suitable coordinate systems Hess(V )(p)(u, u) =
with n + + n − = dim(T ∆) = n − 1. The number n − is called the index of p (with respect to V ) and is written Ind(p, V ). (ii) If furthermore L is C 2 and p is hyperbolic,
Proof. From Lemma 3.6, p is non degenerate if and only if DF π (p) is invertible and (see the proof of Lemma 3.6)
Now, a direction computation (details are left to the reader) of the Hessian of V at x leads to
where u, v 1/π stands for i u i v i 
Since p is also a critical point ∇V (p) = 0. Let u ∈ E s p and let
2 path with γ(0) = p,γ(0) = u. Set h(t) = V (γ(t)). Thenḣ(0) = 0 (because p is a critical point of V ) and h ′′ (0) = HessV (p)u, u is non negative because h(t) ≥ h(0).
On the other hand, by the spectral decomposition of HessV (p) we can write
Remark 6.2 This later proposition shows that in the neighborhood of an hyperbolic equilibrium p,ẋ = F (x) andẋ = −∇V (x) are topologically conjugate. Indeed, part (ii) of the proposition implies that the linear flows {e tDF (p) } and {e tHess(V )(p) } are topologically conjugate (see e.g Theorem 7.1 in [22] ), and by Hartman-Grobman Theorem (see again [22] ), nonlinear flows are locally conjugate to their linear parts in the neighborhood of hyperbolic equilibria. However, note that while eigenvalues of Hess(V )(p) are reals there is no evidence that the same is true for DF (p) in general. The next proposition proves that this is the case when L(x) is reversible with respect to π(x). (ii) p is hyperbolic for F if and only if it is a non degenerate critical point of V.
T is a definite positive operator for the scalar product on T ∆ defined by u, v 1/p = i u i v i
Using (19) and (20) it comes that for all u, v ∈ T ∆
Replacing g 0 (p) by α(p)s ′ (1)g 0 (p) proves the result.
A useful consequence of this later proposition is that it is usually much easier to verify non degeneracy of equilibria rather than hyperbolicity. Here is an illustration:
Example 6.4 [Gibbs systems, 4]
Consider the symmetric Gibbs model analyzed in [11] (see remark 5.4 and example 5.10). We suppose that the symmetric matrix U = (U ij ) is given and we treat U 0 = (U 0 i ) i∈S and β as parameters. Let Ξ rev (U 0 ) denote the set of maps
such that L β verifies assumption 3.2, is C 1 in x, and L β (x) is reversible with respect to π β (x) where
Proposition 6.5 There exists an open and dense set
There exists an open dense set B 0 ⊂ R + containing 0 such that for all β ∈ B 0 equilibria of F β are hyperbolic.
where V U 0 ,β is given by (15) . Since ∂H ∂U 0 (x, U 0 , β) is the identity map, H is a submersion. Hence, by Thom's parametrized transversality Theorem (see [13] , Chapter 3), there exists an open and dense set G 0 ∈ R n such that for all 
Equilibria of Potential Games
Consider a population game with C 1 payoff function U : ∆ → R n . Recall that the game is called a potential game, provided U i (x) = − ∂W ∂x i (x) for all x ∈ ∆ and some potential W : R n → R. Point x * ∈ ∆ is called a Nash equilibrium of U if, given the population state x * , every agent has interest to play the mixed strategy
We let NE(U) denote the set of Nash equilibria of U. For all β ≥ 0 and x ∈ ∆ we let π β (x) ∈ ∆ be defined as
and we let χ(β, U) (respectively, χ rev (β, U)) denote the set of all vector fields having the form given by (1) where L(x) is C 1 in x, irreducible and admits π β (x) as invariant (respectively reversible) probability. Recall (see equation (9) ) that
Our aim here is to describe Eq(F ) for F ∈ χ(β, U) in term of NE(U) for large β, with a particular emphasis on potential games. Some of the results here are similar to the results obtained in [5] for n × 2 pseudo games.
Proposition 6.7 Let N be a neighborhood of NE(U). There exists β 0 ≥ 0 such that for all β ≥ β 0 and F ∈ χ(β, U) Eq(F ) ⊂ N Proof. Equilibria of F coincide with equilibria of F π β . Let x(β) be such an equilibrium. Then for all i, j
Thus for every limit point x * = lim β k →∞ x(β k ) it follows that
and
if i ∈ Supp(x * ) and j ∈ Supp(x * ).
Remark 6.8 Note that Proposition 6.7 only requires the continuity of U.
We shall now prove some converse results. A Nash equilibrium x * is called pure if Supp(x * ) has cardinal 1 and mixed otherwise. It is called strict if inequality (22) is strict for all i ∈ Supp(x * ).
Theorem 6.9 Let x * be a pure strict Nash equilibrium and N a (sufficiently small) neighborhood of x * . Then, there exists β 0 > 0 such that for all β ≥ β 0 and F ∈ χ(β, U)
(iii) Assume furthermore that the game is a potential game. Then x * β is linearly stable for F under one of the following conditions:
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that x * 1 = 1 and x * i = 0 for i = 1.
Set R ij = U j − U i . By assumption and continuity, there exists δ > 0, α > 0 such that for all x ∈ B(x * , α) = {x ∈ ∆ : x−x * ≤ α},
This implies that π β maps B(x * , α) into itself for β large enough. By Brouwer's Theorem, it then admits a fixed point x * β . To prove uniqueness and assertion (ii) it suffices to prove that π β restricted to B(x * , α) is a contraction. From the expression π β,i = ( j e βR ij ) −1 , we get
If R ij (x * ) = 0. Then i = 1 and
These inequalities show that Dπ β (x) < 1 for all x ∈ B(x * , α) and β large enough, proving uniqueness of the equilibrium as well as assertion (ii). The last assertion follows from Propositions 6.1 and 6.3.
A Nash equilibrium x * is called fully mixed if Supp(x * ) = {1, . . . , n} and partially mixed if 1 < card(Supp(x * )) < n. A fully mixed Nash equilibrium is called non degenerate if for all
A partially mixed equilibrium x * is called non degenerate if for all
Lemma 6.10 Let x * ∈ ∆ be a mixed equilibria. Assume that Supp(x * ) = {1, . . . , r} for some 1 < r ≤ n and set
Let, for i = 1, . . . , r − 1,
Then x * is non degenerate if and only if the (r − 1) × (r − 1) matrix
is invertible.
Proof. One has
Then it is easily seen that
This proves that x * is non degenerate if and only if
Theorem 6.11 Let x * be a non degenerate fully mixed Nash equilibrium for U and N a (sufficiently small) neighborhood of x * . Then, there exists β 0 > 0 such that for all β ≥ β 0 and F ∈ χ(β, U)
Assume furthermore that the game is a potential game with potential W. Then x * β is hyperbolic for F and its unstable manifold (for F ) has dimension Ind(x * , W | ∆ ) under one of the following conditions :
Proof. Set T = 1/β. Equilibria of F π β are given by the set of equations
or, with the notation of Lemma 6.10,
. . , q n−1 ) is solution to (24) . Hence, by the implicit function theorem (which hypothesis is fulfilled by the non degeneracy of x * and Lemma 6.10) there exists α 0 > 0, a neighborhood O of q in (R *
This proves the first assertion of the theorem with β 0 > 1/α 0 and
In case, the game is a potential game with potential W, F is gradient-like with Lyapounov function V β given by (16) . Since x * is fully mixed,
In particular, for β large enough HessV β (x * β ) is non degenerate, because x * is non degenerate. The last assertion then follows from Propositions 6.1 and 6.3.
Theorem 6.12 Let x
* be a strict and non degenerate partially mixed Nash equilibrium for U which support has cardinal 1 < r < n. Let N be a (sufficiently small) neighborhood of x * . Then, there exists β 0 > 0 such that for all β ≥ β 0 and F ∈ χ(β, U)
Assume furthermore that the game is a potential game with potential W and that one of the following conditions hold :
Then x * β is hyperbolic and
) stands for the dimension of the unstable manifold (for F ).
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that Supp(x * ) = {1, . . . , r} and set
. . y n−r ) and set x = (x 1 , . . . , x r−1 ), y = (y 1 , . . . , y n−r ). Thus, with β = 1/T, equilibria of F π β are given by the following system of equations: (25) and
where h r i is defined in Lemma 6.10. The triplet (T = 0, x = q, y = 0) is solution to (25) . Thus by the non degeneracy hypothesis and the implicit function theorem, there exists a smooth map
where O is a neighborhood of (0, 0) in R×R n−r and V a neighborhood of q in R r−1 such that (T,x(T, y), y) is solution to (25) . Recall that 0 < r−1 i=1 q i < 1 and h r i+r (q, 0) < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n − r (because x * is strict). Thus, by choosing O small enough we can furthermore ensure that
and h r i+r (x(T, y), y) ≤ −δ < 0, i = 1 . . . n − r
for all (T, y) ∈ O. Now replacing x byx(T, y) in (26) leads to
Using (27) and (28) we see that α small enough and T ≤ log(1/α) δ G(T, ·) maps {y ∈ R n−r : 0 ≤ y i ≤ α} into itself. By Brouwer's fixed point theorem, G(T, ·) admits a fixed pointŷ(T ). Furthermore, D y G(T, y) ≤ C T e −δ/T for some constant C making G(T, ·) a contraction. This implies thatŷ(T ) is unique. Finally define x * β by x * β,i =x i (T,ŷ(T )) for 1 ≤ i < r and x * β,i+r =ŷ i (T ) for 1 ≤ 1 ≤ n − r.
We now prove the last assertions. By assumption, T ∆(x * ) admits a decomposition T ∆(x * ) = E + ⊕ E − with Hess(W )(x * )u, u > 0 (respectively < 0) for all u ∈ E + (respectively E − ) and u = 0. Set T ∆ s (x * ) = {u ∈ T ∆ : u 1 = . . . = u r = 0}. Then
Let now V β be the Lyapounov function given (16) . Then for all
The construction of x * β shows that → ∞ for i > r when β → ∞. Thus, for β large enough, Q β is non degenerate, definite positive on E + and T ∆ s (x * ), and definite negative on E − .
This implies that its index is bounded below by k = dim(E − ) and above by min (r − 1, n − r − k). This index equals the dimension of the stable manifold by Proposition 6.1. Under the reversibility assumption hyperbolicity follows from Proposition 6.3.
Reversibility and Gradient Structure
Recall that an irreducible rate matrix L is called reversible with respect to π ∈∆ is π i L ij = π j L ji . In this case π is the (unique) invariant probability of L. Here we will consider gradient properties of (1) under the assumption that L(x) is reversible.
A C k , k ≥ 0 (Riemannian) metric on∆ (or ∆) is a C k map g such that for each x ∈ ∆ g(x) : T ∆ × T ∆ → R is a definite positive bilinear form. Given a C 1 map V :∆ → R we let grad g V denote the gradient vector field of V with respect to g. That is
Proposition 7.1 Assume that for all x ∈∆ L(x) is reversible with respect to π(x) and assume that the map h :∆ → R n , defined by
is a α-quasigradient. Then there exists a metric g on∆ such that for all
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 6.3. Let
is a definite positive operator for the scalar product on T ∆ defined
. Define now a Riemannian metric on
Since
, u .
is a quasi gradient, this makes F a gradient for the metric g(x) = α(x)g 0 (x). Example 7.2 Suppose that L(x) is reversible with respect to π, independent on x. Then x → x π is the gradient of the χ 2 function V (x) = i (
Under the weaker assumption that x → s(
) is a quasi-gradient for some strictly increasing function s (see Theorem 5.3)) it is no longer true that F is a gradient, but it can be approximated by a gradient. The next Lemma is the key tool. Its proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 6.3. and
This shows that G is a C 1 approximation of F which coincides with F on {v(x) ≥ 3ε} and with G 0 on {v(x) ≤ ε}. Furthermore,
with equality if and only if x ∈ E. Now, for all x ∈∆ \ E
and the splitting is smooth in x. Hence u ∈ T ∆ can be uniquely written as u = P x (u) + t x (u)G(x) with t x (u) ∈ R and P x (u) ∈ ∇V (x) ⊥ . Let g be the metric on∆ \ E defined by
Then g coincides with g 0 on {0 < x < v(x) < ε} so that g can be extended to a C 2 metric on∆. By construction of G and g, G = −grad g V. Let π : ∆ →∆ be a smooth function. Assume that π verifies the assumption of Theorem 5.3 and that F π has non degenerate equilibria. Let χ π, rev denote the convex set of vector fields having the form given by (the right hand side of) (1), where for each x ∈ ∆, L(x) is irreducible and reversible with respect to π(x). By Theorem 5.3, Proposition 6.3 and Theorem 7.4 all the elements of χ π, rev have the same strict Lyapounov function V, hyperbolic equilibria (given by the critical points of V ) and are C 1 close to −grad g V for some metric g. We may then wonder wether χ π, rev is structurally stable. The following construction shows that this is not the case.
Questions of Structural Stability

Potential Games are not structurally stable
Here ∆ stands for the 2-dimensional simplex in R 3 . Let
and  : R 3 → R 2 be the projection defined by (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = (x 1 , x 2 ). Note that  maps ∆ homeomorphically onto∆.
LetW : R 2 → R be a smooth function. Assume that (a) −∇W points inward∆ on ∂∆;
(b) The critical set crit(W ) = {y ∈∆ : ∇W (y) = 0} consist of (finitely many) non degenerate points,
In particular, the diagonal D(∆) = {(y 1 , y 2 ) ∈∆ : y 1 = y 2 } is positively invariant under the dynamicṡ
(c) There is a saddle connection contained in D(∆), meaning that there are two saddle points ofW s 1 , s 2 ∈ D(∆) and some (hence every) point y ∈]s 1 , s 2 [ which α limit set under (30) is s 1 and omega limit set is s 2 .
It is not hard to construct such a map.
Consider now the 3− strategies potential game associated to W. Payoffs are then defined by
Using the notation of section 6.1, record that F π β = −Id + π β where π β is defined by (23) , and χ rev (β, U) is the set of vector fields given by (1) with L(x) irreducible and reversible with respect to π β (x).
Proposition 8.1 For all β > 0 sufficiently large, there exists F ∈ χ rev (β, U) (which can be chosen C 1 close to F π β ) which is not equivalent to F π β .
Proof of Proposition 8.1
By definition of Nash equilibria (see section 6.1) and condition (a) above, Nash equilibria of U are fully mixed and coincide with critical points ofW :
crit(W ) = (NE(U)).
Lemma 8.2
For all ε > 0 there exists β 0 > 0 such that for all β ≥ β 0 and F ∈ χ rev (β, U) there is a one to one map
(ii) The unstable (respectively stable) manifold of p β has dimension Ind(p,W , ) (resp. 2 − Ind(p,W )). In particular, s are saddle points.
(iv) Under the dynamics induced by F π β , the interval [s Proof. Assertions (i) and (ii) this follows from Propositions 6.7 and 6.11.
On  −1 (D(∆)) = {(x 1 , x 1 , 1 − 2x 1 )} equilibria of F π β are given by the implicit equation T (log(x 1 ) − log(1 − 2x 1 )) = U 1 (x 1 , x 1 ) where T = 1/β. Solutions for T = 0 coincide with  −1 (D(∆) ∩ crit(W )). For T > 0 and small enough, assertion (iii) then follows from the implicit function theorem.
By condition (c),
We now construct F ∈ χ rev (β, U). Let L(x) be the rate matrix defined for i = j by
where a : ∆ → R + is a smooth function to be defined below. Then equation (1) readṡ
The map x → x 3 e βU 1 (x) − x 1 vanishes at points s (ii) x → x 3 π β,1 (x) − x 1 π β,3 (x) has constant sign on B η . Let x → a(x) be such a = 0 on ∆\B η , a > 0 on B η and 0 ≤ a ≤ η on ∆. Then, the alpha limit set of q 1 equals s 1 β , for both F and F π β but sinceẋ 1 −ẋ 2 doesn't vanish on B η the trajectory through q 1 exits B η at a point = q 2 and, consequently, the omega limit set of q 1 for F is distinct from s 2 β . This proves that F and F π β are not equivalent.
Open question
The preceding construction shows that χ rev (β, U) is not structurally stable for an arbitrary potential game but this might be the case for particular examples. Consider for example the Gibbs model described in Remark 5.4. For U 0 ∈ R n and U = (U ij ) symmetric, let χ rev (β, U 0 , U) be the set of C 1 vector field given by (1) with L(x) irreducible and reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure (14) .
Question For generic (U 0 , U) and β large enough, is χ rev (β, U 0 , U) structurally stable ?
Appendix
Let L be an irreducible rate matrix and π ∈∆ denote the invariant probability of L. That is the unique solution (in ∆) of πL = 0. For all f, g ∈ R n we let
The Dirichlet form of L is the map E : R n → R + defined as
By irreducibility, E(f ) > 0 unless f is constant, and the spectral gap λ = sup{E(f ) : f, 1 π = 0, f, f π = 1} is positive. We let L * be the irreducible rate matrix defined by
Note that L * admits π as invariant probability and that L * is the adjoint of L for , π .
We let L T : T ∆ → T ∆ be defined by
Finally recall that for all f ∈ R n f π stands for the vector defined by ( 
In particular L T is invertible and L T is a definite negative operator for , 1 π whenever L is reversible with respect to π. 
Proof of Lemma 5.5
Given f ∈ R n we write f ≥ 0 if f i ≥ 0 for all i. We let 1 ∈ R n denote the vector which components are all equal to 1. For all t ≥ 0 we let P t = e tL . Since L is a rate matrix, (P t ) is a Markov semigroup meaning that P t f ≥ 0 for all f ∈ R n with f ≥ 0 and P t 1 = 1.
Lemma 9.2 Let I ⊂ R be an open interval and S : I → R a C 2 function such that S ′′ (t) ≥ α > 0. Let f ∈ R n be such that f i ∈ I for all i. Then d dt S(P t f ), 1 π | t=0 ≤ −αE(f ).
Proof. For all u, v ∈ I S(v) − S(u) − S ′ (u)(v − u) ≥ α/2(v − u) 2 . Hence for all i, j S(f j ) − S((P t f ) i ) − S ′ ((P t f ) i )(f j − (P t f ) i ) ≥ α/2(f j − (P t f ) i ) 2 .
Applying P t to this inequality gives P t (Sf ) i − S((P t f ) i ) ≥ α/2P t (f i − (P t f ) i ) 2 ) = α/2(P t f 2 i − (P t f ) 2 i ) Hence P t (Sf ) − S((P t f )) ≥ α/2P t (f − (P t f ))
2 ) = α/2(P t f 2 − (P t f ) 2 ).
Therefore, using the fact that P t g, 1 π = g, 1 π leads to
Dividing by t and letting t → 0 leads to the desired inequality. Proof. For x ∈ ∆ let x(t) = xe tL , f i =
, f i (t) = x i (t) π i and P * t g = e tL * g. Note that P * t ) is the adjoint of P t with respect to , π . For all g ∈ R n , x(t), g = x, P t g = f, P t g π = P * t f, g π so that f (t) = P * and the results follows from Corollary 9.3.
